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WISCONSIN'S 
MODIFIED, MODIFIED 
COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE L A?  
JohnJ. Kircher 
isconsin has a long and storied history 
of comparative negligence law. It dates 
back to 1931 when the statute creating 
the rule was first enacted.1 Prior to 1995, 
only one substantive change was made in 
the statute. In 1971 the words "greater 
than" were substituted for "as great as" so 
that, in its totality, section 895.045 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes provided: 
"Contributory negligence shall not bar 
recovery in an action by any person or the 
person's legal representative to recover 
damages for negligence resulting in death 
or in injury to person or property, if such 
negligence was not greater than the negli-
gence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to the 
person recovering. 
1995 marks the second major substan-
tive change in Wisconsin's comparative 
negligence statute. Through section 1 of 
1995 Wisconsin Act 17, the Wisconsin 
Legislature added language to the statute 
which makes it relatively clear that the 
drafters set out to accomplish two things: 
1) to codify a previous court interpretation 
of the rule3; and 2) to partially eliminate 
the doctrine of joint and severalliability.4 
This article examines those two provi-
sions; attempts to discern legislative in-
How Wisconsin courts will interpret recent, dramatic changes in 
comparative negligence law will depend upon how the courts 
interpret the legislative product. Here's one person's educated 
guess on what that interpretation might entail. 
tent; and briefly explores possible reper-
cussions of those changes. 
At the outset note should be taken of 
basic rules of statutory construction fol-
lowed by Wisconsin courts. Construction 
of a statute is a question of law, with no 
deference being given to lower court inter-
pretations.5 The purpose of statutory con-
struction is to give effect to legislative 
intent.6 When determining legislative in-
tent, the court first examines the language 
of the statute itself and will resort to extrin-
sic aids only if the language is ambiguous. 7 
Reiter codification 
The first substantive change8 to section 
895.045 of the Wisconsin Statutes, ef-
fected by section 1 of 1995 Wisconsin Act 
17, appears to be an attempt to codify a 
principle enunciated by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Reiter v. Dyken.9 The 
importance of Reiter is put in better con-
text by understanding that it followed the 
court's decision in May v. Skelley Oil Co.10 
In May the court intimated that it was 
poised, given the appropriate case, to 
change its construction of the comparative 
negligence statute so that, to determine 
liability, the plaintiff' s negligence would 
be measured against the combined negli-
gence of all defendants. Many thought that 
Reiter would be that appropriate case. 
However, in Reiter the court restated the 
principle that, to determine liability, a 
plaintiff's causal negligence is to be exam-
ined separately in relation to the causal 
negligence of each defendant. 
The 1995 Act adds a new sentence to 
the statute, providing that the plaintiff's 
negligence "shall be measured separately 
against the negligence of each person 
found to be causally negligent." 1 In light 
of the 1995 amendment, it should be 
understood that Reiter was not concerned 
with how negligence is "measured." The 
"measuring" or comparison of the par-
ties' negligence is carried out by the trier 
of fact- in most cases a lay jury. The jury 
is in?tructcd, for example: 
"You will determine how much and to 
what extent each party is to blame for the 
injuries to the plaintiff and whether the 
conduct of one made a largcr1 equal or 
smaller contribution than the other. You 
will fix the percentage attributable to 
each party in proportion to the fault that 
he contributed to cause the plaintiff's 
injurics." 12 
Prior to its most recent amendment, 
section 895.045 expressed the principle 
that a plaintiff would be barred from 
recovery only if her negligence was found 
to be greater than that of the person 
against whom recovery is sought. Reiter, 
and presumably the amending language, 
is concerned with what a court does with 
the percentages after they are "measured" 
by the trier of fact. In determining liabil-
ity under section 895.045, the plaintiff's 
negligence will be considered separately 
against that of each individual defendant, 
and not against the defendants' aggre-
gate negligence. This determines the re-
sponsibility of each defendant to the plain-
tiff. Thus, a plaintiff found to be 40 
percent causally negligent could notre-
cover from any of three defendants each 
found to be 20 percent at fault, even 
though their combined negligence totals 
60 percent. That, Reiter decided, had 
been and would continue to be the proper 
interpretation. That is presumably what 
the 1995 amendment means when it re-
quires that the plaintiff's negligence "shall 
be measured separately against the neg-
ligence of each person found to be caus-
ally negligent." 
There is another possible legislative 
intent, albeit hard to believe and possibly 
inconsistent with the additional amend-
ing language discussed in the next sec-
tion of this article. The language could be 
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interpreted to mean that, in multiple de-
fendant cases, there will be separate divi-
sions of 100 percent between the plaintiff 
and each defendant. At best, that inter-
pretation is strained and a court must 
avoid a statutory interpretation that pro-
duces an absurd or unreasonable rcsult. 13 
The amendment's use of the word 
"measured" could create a problem. The 
sentence could be interpreted to be noth-
ing more than a codification of other 
Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretations 
of the comparative negligence statute. 
Under that precedent, triers of fact are to 
assign separate percentages of negligence 
to each person found to be causally neg-
ligent.14 
The intent to codify Reiter would have 
been more clear if the Legislature had 
chosen language providing, for example, 
that "in determining liability to the plain-
tiff, the negligence percentages of the 
persons against whom recovery is sought 
shall not be combined." Nevertheless, 
the new language added by the Legisla-
ture should foreclose further action by 
the supreme court on the Reiter issue 
because there is no other reasonable in-
terpretation of that language. 
Some might question why, in light of 
Reiter, any new language was necessary. 
The Legislature may have read the Reiter 
decision to mean that the court simply 
was unwilling to adopt a rule combining 
the negligence of defendants to deter-
mine liability to the plaintiff, and not to 
mean that the court thought it lacked the 
power to do so. There would be good 
reason for such a view of the case. The 
Reiter majority stated: 
"Thus the question presented is not 
whether the court has the power to extend 
the defense of contributory negligence 
beyond the limitation placed upon it by 
the legislature, but whether it may limit 
the application of that doctrine further 
than the legislature has required. 
"We believe it can."15 
Joint and several liability 
More interesting than the Reiter issue is 
the concluding language of section 1 of 
the Act, which adds two additional sen-
tences to the statute: 
"The liability of each person found to 
be causally negligent whose percentage 
of causal negligence is less than 51% is 
limited to the percentage of the total 
causal negligence attributed to that per-
son. A person found to be causally neg-
ligent whose percentage of causal negli-
gence is 51% or more shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the damages al-
Iowed."16 
This ne? language is concerned with 
joint and several liability, leaving intact a 
basic princi?le of the unamended Wis-
consin comparative negligence rule - a 
plaintiff whose negligence is "greater 
than" that of an individual defendant will 
not be able to recover damages from that 
defendant. For example, let us assume a 
situation in which a plaintiff's total dam-
ages are found to be $100,000, and in 
which percentages of causal negligence 
are determined to be as follows: 
p 
30 
D1 
30 
D2 
30 
D3 
10 
No legislative intent should be in-
ferred that would allow the plaintiff to 
recover from anyone other than Dl and 
D2. The unamended portion of the stat-
?te still provides that if the plaintiff's 
negligence is "greater than" the negli-
gence of a defendant, the plaintiff will be 
barred from recovery against that person. 
Thus no recovery from D3 should be 
possible. As to the plaintiff's recovery 
from D1 and D2, the total damages of 
$100,000 first would be reduced by 30 
percent to the sum of $70,000 because of 
the plaintiff's fault. The unamended lan-
guage of what is now section 895.045(1) 
calls for that reduction by continuing to 
provide that "any damages allowed shall 
be diminished in the proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributed to the 
person recovering." 
After the reduction reflecting the 
plaintiff's portion of causal fault, the 
amendment would appear to require that 
3/6 or 1/2 of the $70,000 would be re-
coverable from Dl and a like amount 
from D2. The Legislature appears to want 
each of the two defendants in this situa-
tion to be severally liable to the plaintiff 
for $35,000, and nothing more. Under 
the "old" rule each of the two defendants 
would be jointly and severally liable to 
the plaintiff for $70,000. 17 Now, with 
several liability under the new rule, the 
insolvency of a liable defendant would 
result in an incomplete recovery for the 
plaintiff. 
The only other plausible interpreta-
tions of the "limited to the percentage of 
the total causal negligence attributed to 
that person" language would be that D 1 
and D2 each would be liable to the plain-
tiff for either 30 percent of the total 
damages (that is, 30% X $100,000 = 
$30,000) or 30 percent of the total dam-
ages after the reduction in proportion to 
the plaintiff's fault (30% X $70,000 = 
$21,000). However, either interpretation 
would mean a second reduction of the 
plaintiff's damages. although the 
unamended language refers to only one 
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form of reduction. Again, a court must 
avoid a statutory interpretation that pro-
duces an absurd or unreasonable result.'8 
Consider if the plaintiff's total dam-
ages in the previous example remained 
the same and the percentages of causal 
negligence were changed to the follow-
ing: 
p 
10 
D1 
20 
D2 
60 
D3 
10 
In this example, the amendment would 
significantly change a portion of Wis-
consin comparative negligence law. 
Again, however, the change would affect 
only rules of joint and several liability. 
Each of the three defendants no longer 
would be jointly and severally liable to 
the plaintiff for total damages, reduced 
by the plaintiff's 10 percent (that is, 
$90,000). As with the previous illustra-
tion D1 and D3 would be severally liable 
only for their shares of the recoverable 
damages (2/9 or $20,000 and 1/9 or 
$10,000, respectively). However, with 
respect to D2, who has "51% or more" of 
the causal negligence, the amendment 
would appear to make her jointly and 
severally liable with the others for all of 
the plaintiff's recoverable damages. Thus, 
the plaintiff could recover the entire 
$90,000 from D2. 
No portion of the amending language 
speaks to the issue of the contribution 
rights of parties once the plaintiff has 
been made whole. It is generally ac-
cepted that fo r a right of contribution to 
exist, a party needs: 1) to share common 
liability to the plaintiff with others, and 2) 
to have paid more than her fair share of 
the plaintiff's damages.19 With the addi-
tion of the new language it would appear 
that, with one exception to be noted sub-
sequently, only one who is "51% or more" 
causally negligent will be in a position to 
have paid more than her fair share of the 
recoverable damages. As noted in the last 
example above, only D2 could be forced 
to pay the plaintiff the total amount of the 
plaintiff's recoverable damages. In fact, 
basic math portends that in no case could 
there ever be more than one party who is 
"?1% or more" causa II y negligent.20Thus, 
using the figures supplied above, if D2 
paid the plaintiff all the recoverable dam-
ages of $90,000, D2 would have contri-
bution rights against Dl and D3 for their 
fair shares of the $90,000 (2/9 or $20,000 
and 1/9 or $10,000, respectively). Of 
course, the foregoing assumes that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court will deter-
mine that with Dl and D3 being only 
severally liable and D2 being jointly and 
severally liable, the three share "com-
mon liability" to the plaintiff. 
February 1996 
The subjects of comparative negli-
gence and contribution in Wisconsin natu-
rally lead to the topic of releases, particu-
larly the famousPierringer release. 2' The 
value of the Pierringer release lies in the 
fact that a settling defendant can make 
her peace with the plaintiff without worry 
about a later contribution claim by a 
nonsettlor. The amendments should have 
little impact upon the use of these re-
leases. Settlors will not be aware, until 
after the trial, of whether their liability to 
the plaintiff was only several or joint and 
several. Pretrial settlement could lead to 
a situation in which the settlor paid more 
than her fair share of a plaintiff's recov-
erable damages, even though the settlor 
is subsequently found less than 51 per-
cent causally negligent. Normal rules of 
contribution would apply to such a situ-
ation. However, the Legislature has im-
posed a rather short one-year statute of 
limitations applicable to pretrial settle-
ment contribution claims.22 
Conclusion 
The foregoing have merely been one 
person's educated guesses as to how 
Wisconsin courts will interpret these dra-
matic changes in comparative negligence 
law. What is important is how Wisconsin 
courts will interpret the legislative prod-
uct. No one can predict with certainty 
how Wisconsin courts will integrate these 
changes into the comparative negligence 
jurisprudence. One should remember the 
words of Justice Frankfurter that "[t)he 
intrinsic difficulties of language and the 
emergence, after enactment, of situations 
not anticipated by even the most gifted 
legislative imagination reveal the doubts 
and ambiguities in statutes that so often 
compel judicial construction."23 
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